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For thousands of years, it has been regulated, reviled, and criminalized,
yet it remains a deeply entrenched and pervasive institution in our society.
Despite its ubiquitous presence, prostitution and the problems associated
with it-the violence, abuse, and degradation of women-remain invisible
to and low priorities for the nation's law enforcement agencies. Invisibil-
ity, paradoxically, is even more pronounced in cases of forced prostitu-
tion.' This Note first examines the nature of forced prostitution and the
1. This Note only deals with forced prostitution and does not address cases where women volunta-
rily work as prostitutes. Women who choose prostitution as a mode of employment will simply not
exercise the option of instituting civil suits described in this Note. This Note considers forced prostitu-
tion in accordance with the definition proposed by Kathleen Barry: Forced prostitution or "[flemale
sexual slavery is present in all situations where women or girls cannot change the immediate condi-
tions of their existence; where regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get out; and
where they are subject to sexual violence and exploitation." K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 33
(1979). This Note thus focuses on external conditions, such as the organization of business, modes of
recruitment, and trafficking patterns, rather than on internal, psychological motivations of women in
prostitution. Id. at 7. The inquiries are shifted away from the victim's innocence or purity, whether
she is a "madonna" or "whore," and whether or not she initially entered into prostitution voluntarily.
Id. at 10. "The issue is not whether a child, teenager, or adult woman is a poor, innocent, sweet
young thing." Id. Despite the enormity of the problem, reluctance to acknowledge its presence contin-
ues. R. ROSEN, THE LoS SISTERHOOD 112-16 (1982). When the subject is confronted, its treatment
borders on sensationalism, K. BARRY, supra, at 10, and its coverage is riddled with dramatization of
lurid details of young girls trapped by evil men, R. ROSEN, supra, at 114-15. The image of a victim-
ized white girl is created and captured by the popularly coined phrase "white slave." K. BARRY,
supra, at 27. The White-Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act), ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982)) was passed, in the words of its sponsor, Representative
Mann, to assist "those women and girls who, if given a fair chance, would, in all human probability,
have been good wives and mothers." C. BARNES, THE WHITE SLAVE ACT, (1946), submitted in
Petitioner's Brief at 27, Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 47,
61st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909)). The concept of "white slavery" reflects the tenor of the late nine-
teenth to early twentieth century purity crusade, which focused on "the immoral destruction of inno-
cent girls' virtue and sinful incontinence in men." K. BARRY, supra, at 26. White, middle class
women were the embodiments of innocence and purity. See R. ROSEN, supra, at 49, 62. By contrast,
this Note is concerned not with issues of morality but with issues of power and sexual exploitation.
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illegal traffic in women for this purpose. It then describes how a private
right of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)2 can enable women in prostitution to fight the problems that
the government can or will not.
I. NATURE OF PROBLEM
Forced prostitution today is a highly organized, 3 clandestine, and im-
mensely profitable4 business in which women are controlled by organized
enterprises and pimps who profit from their sexual labors.5 Indeed, the
problem has become so large and organized that the United Nations
(U.N.) has ranked it with other major human rights violations in the
world. U.N. bodies are called on "'to review developments in the field of
slavery and the slave trade in all their practices and manifestations, in-
cluding the slavery-like practices of apartheid and colonialism, the traffic
in persons and the exploitation of the prostitution of others.' "6
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). RICO was enacted as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48.
3. See K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 55, 82; R. ROSEN, supra note 1, at xii, 37; G. SHEEHY,
HUSTLING 13-14, 121-23 (1973); see also infra note 6 and accompanying text.
4. See R. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 71-72; G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 4 (estimated 7 to 9 billion
dollars annually); Kaplan & Kessler, The Economics of Prostitution, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
CRIME 327-28 (L. Kaplan & D. Kessler eds. 1976) (gross revenues in massage parlors estimated at
$2000 to $3000 daily by New York City Police Department vice squad members); see also Plea by
Girl, 15, Sparks Raid on Sex Studio, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 28, 1972, at 10-A, col. 1 [hereinafter
Detroit Free Press] ($17,000 confiscated from Times Square massage parlor, estimated by police to be
no more than "a week's take").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (women
bought and sold by pimps), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
Prostitution remains an enormously profitable business, with most of the profits siphoned off
by men-pimps, taxidrivers, members of organized crime, liquor dealers, physicians, and real
estate speculators. . . . [I]t is nearly impossible for a woman to ply her trade independently on
the street for fear of trespassing on some pimp's territory.
R. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 171-72. G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 5-7 (average net income is less than
$100 per week for streetwalker; pimps demand $200 to $250 per night from their girls, but girls
themselves keep no more than five percent), 105 (one woman interviewed turned over all money to
her pimp); Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution Law, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1235, 1246 n.62 (1976) (control of prostitutes by pimps); Kaplan & Kessler, supra
note 4, at 328; cf. NATIONAL PROSTITUTION COMM., NATIONAL ORG. FOR WOMEN, WORKING ON
PROSTITUTION 8-9 (n.d.) [hereinafter PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE] (psychological reasons why pros-
titutes have pimps); Jennings, supra, at 1246-47 (prostitutes, especially streetwalkers, rely on pimps
for protection).
6. Updating of the Report on Slavery Submitted to the Sub-commission in 1966, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, (35th sess.) (Agenda Item 14) at para. 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1982/20/Add.l (1982) (emphasis added). For more information on international treatment of
the trafficking business, see id. at para. 72(xv)-(xvii); Exploitation of Labour Through Illicit and
Clandestine Trafficking, U.N. ESCOR Commission on the Status of Women (25th sess.) (Agenda
Item 9) at paras. 32, 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/582 (1973) [hereinafter Exploitation of Labour]. In his
official report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Jean Fernand-Laurent, wrote: "[W]e . . . consider
prostitution to be a form of slavery." Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Suppression of The
Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, U.N. ESCOR, (1st reg. sess.)
(Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. E/1983/7 (1983) [hereinafter Fernand-Laurent], reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL FEMINISM: NETWORKING AGAINST FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY app. 6 at 131 (K. Barry,
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A. How Women Are Procured
To run and furnish the sex slave business, women are recruited by or-
ganized rings of procurers, using fraudulent recruiting methods. For ex-
ample, they are abducted,8 procured through organized crime, recruited
by phony employment agencies, and trafficked into the U.S. via false mar-
riage contracts.
The migrant labor system is particularly susceptible to abuse because
migrant workers are organized under the strict supervision of crew lead-
ers, who often seek to control the workers and keep them in debt by in-
ducing them to spend their money on liquor and prostitution.9 Women,
many of whom are retarded or emotionally disturbed, and recently re-
leased from mental institutions, are recruited for work by these crew lead-
ers; once they arrive, however, they are "forced to serve as labor camp
prostitutes in return for food." 10 Other women serve the migrant camps
after having been released from prison and sold to the crew leaders by
jailers for a small sum of money."'
Bogus employment agencies and artistic tours provide another common
C. Bunch & S. Castley eds. 1984) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM]. Traffic in women and
forced prostitution are internationally recognized as organized criminal activity. The enormous scope
of trafficking has led the United Nations to recommend that all appropriate international organiza-
tions-the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization, the
International Labor Organization, the U.N. Children's Fund, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, the World Tourism Organization, Interpol, and other non-governmental agen-
cies-be coordinated to address the problem. E.S.C. Res. 1982/20, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at
15, U.N. Doe. E/1982/82 (1982).
7. Exploitation of Labour, supra note 6, para. 6 (U.N. Commission on Status of Women address-
ing problem of "young girls and women who were lured into lives of prostitution by false promises of
overseas jobs"), para. 32 (women who are "recruited under the cover of seemingly normal contracts
for prostitutional or pre-prostitutional activities . . . may find themselves in an illegal situation in-
volving practices similar to slavery or a form of forced labour"); Interpol Report, Report by the Gen-
eral Secretariat of Interpol, U.N. Division of Human Rights (1974), reprinted in K. BARRY, supra
note 1, app. A, at 238 (modes of recruitment); S. BARLAY, SEX SLAVERY 61-74, 78-90 (rev. ed. 1975)
(fraudulent theatrical touring troupes); K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 90; R. ROSEN, supra note 1, at
125-26 (false promises of marriage; fraudulent employment agencies; offers of assistance to teenage
runaways).
8. See United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1463-64 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 879 (1986) (women bought and sold by motorcycle gang operating prostitution enterprise);
United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1422, 1427 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984)
(women abducted and held by motorcycle gang for prostitution); United States v. Bankston, 603 F.2d
528, 530 (5th Cir. 1979) (women abducted at gunpoint and told to engage in prostitution); United
States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (same);
see also A Shocking Glimpse at Cycle Gang Life, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 12, 1979, at 11, col. 4
(hitchhikers beaten and forced to prostitute themselves).
9. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Plight of America's Five Million Migrants, Ms., June 1978, at 65, 66.
10. Id. Sociologist Richard Morrison, coordinator of a migrant service agency, described finding a
retarded black woman who had been transported from Florida to Virginia to serve as a prostitute for
a crew of a hundred and fifty men. See also United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 603-04 (9th Cir.
1984) (prostitution at migrant labor camps); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d at 1069-70 (prosti-
tution ring controlled by defendants catered to "high-volume, low-overhead business" generated by
migrant workers).
11. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 66-67.
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method of recruitment."2 Women are promised legitimate show-business
jobs by recruiters who tell them upon arrival that the original job is no
longer available and that the only jobs open are those for stripteasers and
exotic dancers.1 3 These women, many of whom are brought into U.S. cit-
ies from Canada, 4 are required to socialize, mix drinks with customers,1 5
and are then forced into prostitution."
One Japanese syndicate, for example, uses this strategy to lure Ameri-
can women into Japan for prostitution. The women are recruited through
seemingly legitimate show-business advertisements placed in American
newspapers by West Coast talent agencies.' Before departure, the recruit
is given a contract specifying salary, place and time of performance, and a
pre-paid plane ticket. Upon arrival, however, she is met by a different
agent and informed that her contract has been bought by him. Her papers
are seized, and she is intimidated and forced into working as a
prostitute. 8
Besides employment frauds, women are also procured through marriage
frauds.' 9 Many Korean women who work in massage parlors throughout
12. See American Guild of Variety Artists: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investi-
gations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter AGVA Hearings] (statement of William J. Scott, former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, North-
ern District of Illinois) (girls from rural areas of U.S. and Canada promised starring roles in show
business and eventually forced into prostitution at exotic nightclubs); id. at 278-79 (statement of Glen
F. Rice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investigator) (Canadian girls recruited by
AGVA agent for legitimate dancing jobs but sent instead to nude dancing clubs, where they were
"held in literal bondage by the club operator" and guarded by bodyguard); see also S. BARLAY, supra
note 7, at 1-17, 50-60 (fraudulent employment agencies advertising for jobs overseas); K. BARRY,
supra note 1, at 90 (general discussion of fraudulent employment agencies); Women-The Suppres-
sion of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others-A Report by Fernand-
Laurent, at 2 (Radio U.N. broadcast, No. 186) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Radio
U.N.] ("girls . . .lured into leaving their country to take part in tournEe of dancing and singing in
cabarets that ends up in brothels").
13. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 134 (statement of William J. Scott), 137-38 (same),
276-80 (statement of Glen Rice).
14. Id. at 282 (statement of Mario T. Noto, Associate Commissioner, INS, Washington, D.C.),
318 (statement of E. Thomas Maxwell, Jr., former Assistant State Attorney, Baltimore City).
15. Id. at 148-49 (woman required to solicit drinks from customers in violation of AGVA union
contract), 261 (statement of Martin Cavanaugh, branch manager of Chicago office of AGVA) (clause
in union contract requiring club owners to comply with laws which prohibit mixing drinks with
customers and prostitution not enforced by union), 327 (statement of E. Thomas Maxwell, Jr.) ("so-
licitation of drinks. . . and prostitution" a prerequisite to keeping job). Although aware of the condi-
tions in the clubs, the union did nothing. Id. at 221-23 (statement of Sergeant Louis Cantone, Intelli-
gence Division, Chicago Police Department).
16. Id. at 134 (statement of William J. Scott), 153 (statement of AGVA dancer) (backrooms in
clubs for prostitution), 159-60 (same), 171-72 (statement of Casimir E. Linkiewicz, chief of police of
Calumet City, Illinois).
17. Oppenheim,Japanese Mafia's Recruiting of American Women Probed, Chicago Trib., Mar.
14, 1982, § 1, at 6.
18. Id.
19. 20/20: GI Brides (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1983) [hereinafter 20120] (transcript on
file with author).
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the U.S. are brought into this country by GIs paid to marry them.20 Fake
marriage brokers set up connections with visa fraud businesses in Korea.
To expedite the process, these brokers collude with U.S. Embassy employ-
ees to manufacture false documents needed to obtain U.S. visas. 1 This
fraud in Korea is in turn connected to organized prostitution rings in the
U.S.2 2 Both work together in the business of "importing prostitutes as sex
slaves," who are employed in saunas and bars that act as fronts for
prostitution. s
The mail-order-bride business is another method used to bring women
into the U.S. While most are legitimate businesses set up to offer Ameri-
can men correspondence and marriage to foreign women,24 many agencies
are fraudulent organizations used as prostitution fronts. 5
B. Organized Prostitution
In all of these schemes, the procurers are not loose and disjointed groups
sporadically engaged in pimping activities. On the contrary, they are or-
ganized networks structured to procure, transport, and retain women in
20. Id. at 3. Telephone interview with Detective Fred Clapp, Los Angeles Police Department,
Administrative Vice Division (Oct. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Clapp Interview] ("It happens a lot with
servicemen. The marriage broker over there [Korea] makes the deal. And the massage parlor owners
here buy these people, usually for a time period, from those people over there that arranged the
marriage."). Police observations of Korean massage parlors in the Queens area of New York City
suggest that the military is being used to bring in the women, although conclusive evidence is hard to
obtain. Interview with Thomas Russo, Executive Assistant District Attorney of Queens County, N.Y.
(Oct. 17, 1986) [hereinafter Russo Interview].
21. The false documents include divorce certificates, false bank statements, and notary public
seals. 20/20, supra note 19, at 4.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 2. Korean women are not the only ones brought into the U.S. for prostitution.
Taiwanese women have also been used. See, e.g., United States v. I Huei Chin, No. S. 86. Cr. 393
(RWS) (S.D.N.Y., filed May 8, 1986); Family Charged with Operating Taiwan Prostitution Ring,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1986, § 1, at 31, col. 2.
24. See Agus, The Brides-To-Order Business, Newsday, Mar. 8, 1984, § 2, at 4 (discussion of
abusive conditions encountered by mail-order brides, even when agencies are legitimate); Joseph,
American Men Find Asian Brides Fill the Unliberated Bill, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at 1, col. 4
(same).
25. Belkin, The Mail-Order Marriage Business, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at
28. "Not all mail-order marriage agencies are reputable. The post office box number listed for an
agency one day may be closed the next, and the business that advertises itself as a marriage broker
may in fact be promoting pornography or prostitution." Id. According to Verne Jervis, a spokesperson
for the INS, "[it is a situation that is rife with the potential for fraud. . . " Id. at 52. Authorities in
the Philippines are "concerned that women are being gulled by phoney introduction agencies that
promise them they will get a foreign husband and instead ship them overseas to work as bar girls or
prostitutes." The Asian Bride Boom, Asiaweek, Apr. 15, 1983, at 36, 43. In 1982, 4,491 Filipinos
entered the U.S. as spouses of Americans, more than twice the combined total from India, Japan,
Taiwan, and the Republic of China. In addition, 1,763 more Filipinos entered the U.S. on fianc6
visas, more than the combined total from Japan, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.
It is not known how many are mail-order brides. Agus, supra note 24, at 4-5. The Philippines has
been cited by Interpol as being part of an "East Asian market" to recruit women and send them to
other countries. K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 50 (referring to report by General Secretariat of Interna-
tional Police Organization submitted to U.N.).
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prostitution.28 Once procured, the women are psychologically conditioned,
physically and mentally intimidated,2" and if needed, trafficked through
established transportation networks.28
These networks also have sound financial bases29 and work largely
through organizations that also conduct legitimate business. In fact, the
modern strip joint, which often is a front for prostitution, "affects to be a
phase of legitimate show business . . . .[A]lthough racketeer controlled,
[the joint] operates with an air of legitimacy with the use of fronts. They
have contracts with the American Guild of Variety Artists and employ
girls who are members of the organization."3
26. See generally supra text accompanying notes 12-25. Investigators into Korean massage parlor
operations believe that "there is a nationwide network involved, going all the way back to Korea."
Russo Interview, supra note 20; see also G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 123 (police found every New
York city midtown massage parlor, except four, run by same overlord and all had ties to one criminal
organization). For testimony on the organized nature of criminal involvement in striptease clubs, see
AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 134, 139, 142, 175, 208, 315-16; 20120, supra note 19, at 5
(statement of Sergeant Fred Palmer, sheriff department, Pierce County, Tacoma, Washington).
27. United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1984) (experts testifying on post-
traumatic stress disorder and psychological conditioning process undergone by victims of forced prosti-
tution); K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 78-82 (psychological conditioning process and courting tech-
niques known as "seasoning" used by pimps to wear down victim and make her psychologically,
emotionally, and financially dependent); Fernand-Laurent, supra note 6, reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL FEMINISM, supra note 6, at 131 (women "subjected by the procurer to a very effective disci-
pline ... undergo a psychological conditioning such as may be experienced by someone living in
community within a sect."); see also AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 134 (women threatened with
their own and children's lives), 159-60 (girls beaten by customers).
28. See AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 139 (statement of William J. Scott, former Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois) (women moved to different cities to avoid ar-
rest). One case involved the transportation of twenty-eight women found suffocated in sealed contain-
ers used to traffic them from St. Martin to St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The metal contain-
ers had no breathing holes, and the women died of suffocation during the two day journey. 28 Women
Said To Die in Cargo Box, Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 21, 1985, at 11A, col. 6.
29. See supra note 4. While prostitution house operators and owners clearly profit from their
operations, as do pimps, supra note 5, a score of other financial interests are involved as well. Many
prominent business people, including property owners and landlords of prostitution hotels, massage
parlors, and topless bars, profit enormously from the sex industry. G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at
12-13, 118-19, 129-30. Lawyers, too, have been involved both as owners of property housing high-
rent tenants in prostitution-related businesses, and as fronts, allowing the massage parlors' incorpora-
tion papers to carry their names rather than the names of the actual owners. Id. at 120-27; see also
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 225 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 TASK FORCE] ("Attorneys' names
appear on [massage parlor] licenses to hide the identity of actual owners. Many of the members of
organized crime who own these facilities are extensively involved in other real estate."); R. ROSEN,
supra note 1, at 71-77 (profiteers of prostitution in early 1900's included wide array of interest
groups, including politicians, police, hotel and saloon owners, and pimps). "It's really an exploitation
issue. While the girls are making some money, the real money is made by the real estate people, the
owners, and the people involved in the trafficking business." Russo Interview, supra note 20. Sheehy
points to the broader context: "The prostitutes continue to take all the arrests, the police to suffer
frustration, the lawyers to mine gold, the operators to laugh, the landowners to insist they have no
responsibility, the mayor to issue press releases. The nature of the beast is, in a word, greed." G.
SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 153-54.
30. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 377 (statement of Daniel Sullivan, operating director of
Crime Commission of Greater Miami). In fact, in many cases, the women working in these striptease
clubs had been promised "stardom in the entertainment field," id. at 278 (statement of Glen Rice,
INS investigator), and had been recruited by AGVA-franchised booking agencies licensed by AGVA
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To avoid detection, the organizations are tightly structured and method-
ically run. Force and threats are often used to intimidate the women to
keep them from leaving or going to the police." In addition, precaution-
ary measures are used to insulate the recruiters from prosecution.3 2 Con-
tact names used in ads for singers change frequently; old offices are va-
cated and new ones opened at different locations."3 The networks provide
the women with a number of aliases and move them to different cities to
work in different prostitution houses. 34 Prosecution is made much more
difficult by the elaborate methods used to evade detection.
to solicit new members. See also supra note 15.
Congress found that "organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity. . . . Its] money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legiti-
mate business and labor unions. ... Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922, at 922-23. It is also "an elusive, changing, nationwide activity involving criminal, quasi-
criminal, and deceptively legitimate individuals." 1976 TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 21. Organized
prostitution is part of this general phenomenon. The Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, after
holding hearings and listening to witness testimony, concluded that:
a) These clubs . . . are controlled by criminal organizations of gangsters and hoodlums
operating through fronts so that they can get the necessary liquor and other licenses.
c) Illegal activities, such as the solicitation of alcoholic drinks from patrons, and even prosti-
tution, exist in these places to the extent that in many cases they are obviously the rule rather
than the exception. A legitimate female entertainer who will not abide by the "house rules,"
however vicious and degrading they may be, cannot work.
d) The AGVA members employed in these clubs are under complete domination and control
of hoodlum owners.
AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 630 (remarks of Sen. McClellan, chairperson, who later became
principal sponsor of RICO). For more documentation of infiltration by organized crime into busi-
nesses and the use of businesses such as massage parlors as fronts for prostitution, see 1976 TASK
FORCE, supra note 29, at 12, 14, 16, 225. Consistent with underworld use of threats and intimidation,
a massage parlor in Times Square, New York City, was found to have used recording equipment,
probably to tape customers for extortion purposes. Detroit Free Press, supra note 4.
31. For specific examples, see AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 138 (statement of William J.
Scott, former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois), 182 (statement of Casi-
mir Linkiewicz, former police chief, Calumet City, Illinois), 213-16 (statement of Sgt. Louis Cantone,
Intelligence Division, Chicago Police Department), 281 (statement of Glen Rice, INS Investigator),
315-16 (statement of Thomas Maxwell, former Assistant State Attorney for Baltimore City).
32. Recruiters often claim they never intended to expose the women they recruited to prostitution
situations. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 137-38 (statement of William J. Scott). The Los
Angeles Police Department could not make any arrests despite extensive investigation: "We could not
prove the recruiters in the U.S. intended for the women to be in the situation they found themselves in
in Japan. We couldn't tie them into any conspiracy. And since the crime occurred outside of our
jurisdiction, we could not make any arrest." Clapp Interview, supra note 20. The U.N. recognizes the
difficulty of proving intent in such cases and has recommended focusing instead on results of the
recruiters' action, rather than on their intent. Exploitation of Labour, supra note 6, para. 29.
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), lists certain acts prohibited under state and federal law, including the
federal statute outlawing the interstate transportation of women for prostitution (Mann Act), 18
U.S.C. § 2421 (1982). Although courts interpreting the Mann Act require that an intent to prostitute
a woman be a "dominant motive" for transporting her interstate, Mortensen v. United States, 322
U.S. 369, 374 (1944), United States v. Lomas, 440 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1971) (prostitution to be
"one of the dominant purposes" of trip), the burden of proving this requirement can be more easily
met by a private plaintiff under civil RICO than under a criminal action by prosecutors. See infra
note 68,
33. Horton & CoIl, White Slaves, PLAYGIRL, Nov. 1982, at 48, 103.
34. 20120, supra note 19, at 5 (statement by Geraldo Rivera, correspondent). According to one
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Nationwide networks of organized prostitution rings also traffic in chil-
dren. "'A group of pimps set up connections in Houston, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, New Orleans, New York and Washington, D.C.' ....
'You could call a number in Houston from Washington and have a young
boy brought to your room in Washington.' ,,a5
C. Ineffectiveness of Official Response
Despite the enormity of the problem, or perhaps because of it, U.S. law
enforcement agencies have made little headway in breaking up the procur-
ing rings. A police officer commenting on his investigation in the traffic of
women to Japan says: "After seven years [on the case] I'm frustrated. I
can't do anything to stop it, the feds can't do anything, and the State
Department doesn't want to do anything.""6 All too often, those in the
position to do something about the problem either ignore or belittle it. For
example, although State Department and Immigration Service officials es-
timate that at least one GI a day is involved in a false marriage,37 top
Army brass deems this illicit traffic mere rumor: "There's always a cer-
tain rumor . . . that there are large numbers, but . . . from the military
standpoint, I don't see that."38 There is sentiment in the Army that it is
improper to evaluate a GI's motive for marriage.3 9
Some enforcement officials in the U.S. are also susceptible to bribery:
"[The city councils and police] let [prostitution fronts] operate. Their
profits are so fabulous that they are able to place such great temptation in
prosecutor, women working at massage parlors in Queens, a New York City borough, are periodically
transported to other massage parlors nationwide. Russo Interview, supra note 20.
35. Call-Boy Rings Said To Aid Spies, Newsday, July 27, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (Detective Anne
Fisher of Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department testifying at hearings called by New
York State Senator Ralph Marino). Runaway girls also provide easy targets for pimps in the New
York City Times Square area, K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 82-83; many come from Minneapolis, a
phenomenon now known as the "Minneapolis pipeline," id.; G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 100-02
(same). Juvenile prostitutes number approximately 500,000 in the United States. PROSTITUTION
COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 11. It is estimated that 600,000 to 1,000,000 children, aged nine to
seventeen, run away from home each year, and that a large percentage of them become prostitutes. R.
TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 60 (1984). According to Los Angeles District Attorney John
Van de Kamp, children have been sold into child prostitution rings for up to S1000. 9 Indicted in a
Child Sex Ring, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 1, 1978, at 2, col. 5; see also Detroit Free Press, supra
note 4 (report by fifteen year old runaway forced into prostitution led to raid on Times Square
massage parlor).
36. Horton & Coil, supra note 33, at 108 (statement of Detective Fred Clapp, Los Angeles Police
Department).
37. 20120, supra note 19, at 5; see also Shaughnessy, Fighting Sexual Exploitation of Women,
NEW WORLD OUTLOOK, Nov. 1983, at 26, 26 (published by United Methodist Church, Education
and Cultivation Division) (Los Angeles police and FBI documented at least 300 to 500 cases a year of
women lured by "talent agencies" for entertainment jobs in Japan).
38. 20120, supra note 19, at 5 (statement of Col. John Thornock, judge advocate general of
Eighth Army in Seoul, South Korea).
39. Id.
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front of law enforcement officers that the first thing you know human
frailties prevail and your whole enforcement mechanism breaks down." '40
Paradoxically, when officials do respond to prostitution, they usually
reinforce the women's helplessness, because current prostitution penal
codes are aimed against the prostitutes.41 Of those arrested in 1979 on
prostitution charges, 70% were female prostitutes and 20% were male
prostitutes; only 10% were customers. 42 The law thus victimizes prosti-
40. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 384 (statement of Sen. Mundt); see also United States v.
Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1982) (operators of prostitution business bribed Justice of
the Peace and constable); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313, 1314-15 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (sheriff took kickbacks from houses of prostitution); United States
v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525-26 (4th Cir. 1980) (local prosecutor offered protection to prostitu-
tion ring in exchange for cash and sexual services); 20120, supra note 19, at 5 (report by correspon-
dent Geraldo Rivera) (money from $10 million per year massage parlor industry in Tacoma, Wash-
ington, used to bribe local officials). For a general discussion of the connection between political office
and organized crime, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL-THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 28-30 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter 1986 REPORT]; 1976 TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 23-33; C. MOLLENHOFF, STRIKE FORCE
54-55, 77-90 (1972); D. PACE & J. STYLES, ORGANIZED CRIME, 26-35 (1975).
41. J. DECKER, PRoSrrtrrITON: REGULATION AND CONTROL 93 (1979). According to John
Decker, "[a]though most of the anti-prostitution laws in effect in the United States are neutral on
their face . .. , it is clear that the primary thrust of the offenses are against the activities of women."
Id. The U.S. legal system of criminalizing prostitution is antithetical to the letter and spirit of the
U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitu-
tion of Others, G.A. Res. 317(IV), U.N. Doe. A/1251, at 33 (1949), which called for the decriminal-
ization of prostitution. The resolution makes prostitution per se neither legal nor illegal. It removes
scrutiny and punishment from the individual women without legitimizing prostitution as an institu-
tion. In other words, it merely tolerates prostitution, while criminalizing pimping and procuring. Cf.
PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 13 (lack of "distinction . . . between a lover relation-
ship in which one person supports another by working as a prostitute . . . makes it difficult for
prostitutes to lead normal lives outside of their work, and does little to protect them from exploitation
by abusive pimps"). Retaining their rights like other citizens, prostitutes would be subject only to the
general scope of civil and business codes, and would be more able to leave prostitution, if they choose
to, without being branded by social stigma or by a criminal record. By contrast, legalization would set
the state up as pimp, and by requiring prostitutes to register, would brand them, making it harder for
them to leave. For example, in several Nevada towns where prostitution is legalized, brothels are
licensed by the state and prostitutes registered and fingerprinted. R. TONG, supra note 35, at 57.
Decriminalization, not legalization, is the system supported by both prostitutes and feminist groups.
See PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 13-19; Macmillan, Prostitution as Sexual Politics,
QUEST: A FEMINIST Q., Summer 1977, at 41; see also Jennings, supra note 5, at 1247-48
(decriminalization would lessen dependence on pimp and would allow greater opportunities for prosti-
tutes to find other employment if they so choose), 1263-65 (disadvantages of legalization and govern-
ment licensing of houses of prostitution).
42. NATIONAL. ORG. FOR WOMEN (NOW), SAN FRANCISCO CHAPTER, PROSTITUTION: A FEM-
INIST ISSUE 1 (n.d.) (pamphlet on file with author); see PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at
7-8 (law enforcement's disproportionate impact on gender and race). FBI Uniform Crime Reports
indicate that 70.7% of arrests in 1976 for prostitution were women. In the same year, blacks com-
prised 52.4%, while whites accounted for 46% of those arrested. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 93; see
also Haft, Hustling for Rights, CIV. LIBERTIES REV., Winter-Spring 1974, at 8, 14 (because many
landlords and bar owners refuse to house black prostitutes, many are forced to become streetwalkers
where they are most vulnerable to arrest). Although 69% of the adult male population have visited a
prostitute at least once, A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN MAI.E 597 (1948), the number of customers arrested is far less than the number of prosti-
tutes. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 398; see also Jennings, supra note 5, at 1255 n.1 19 (testimony by
vice squad officer revealed San Francisco Vice Detail policy of not arresting customers even when
they admitted violation); Sciolino, Off the Street, Prostitution Is Flourishing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
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tutes, "while politicians ignore the structure of commercialized vice which
sustains them."4 3 Raids and crackdowns continue to strike at prostitutes,
especially streetwalkers, but political, financial, and real estate interests in
prostitution remain essentially untouched.,"
Police arrests are often made simply to keep prostitutes off the street, or
to harass them enough to make them leave the area.4 5 Such crackdowns
only reinforce a woman's dependence on her pimp, upon whom she must
now rely to provide bail."' Once the pimp has paid the bail or fines, the
woman is released into his custody. The pimp may then force her into
more acts of prostitution to satisfy her debt to him. Thus, the system it-
self-the criminalization of prostitution, discriminatory enforcement of the
penal code, habitual harassment of prostitutes by repeated arrests and
fines-keeps women trapped in a system of debt bondage.4 7
II. CIVIL RICO: A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil RICO48 allows a private cause of action49 for anyone injured by the
investment in, acquisition or operation of an "enterprise" that affects in-
1984, at Bi, col. I (captain Jerome Piazza, commanding officer of Public Morals Division for south-
ern half of Manhattan, explaining why customers went free although call girls were arrested after
police raid on New York City escort service: "You can ruin a lot of marriages by making a 'john'
collar."). Studies show that the typical patron of prostitutes is a middle-aged, middle-class married
man. J. JAMES, J. WITHERS, M. HAFrT & S. THEISS, THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION 52 (1976);
M. STEIN, LOVERS, FRIENDS, SLAVES 95-96 (1975); James & Burstin, Prostitution in Seattle, 25
WASH. ST. B. NEWS 5, 28 (1971). When the laws are targeted only at prostitutes and not customers,
or when law enforcement officials only enforce facially neutral laws against women, R. TONG, supra
note 35, at 55, the demand for prostitution is allowed to remain essentially unchanged.
43. G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 11.
44. Id. at 11-13.
45. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 102; see also id. at 109-10 (enormous costs of processing police
arrests); PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 11 (in 1977, cost of arresting and keeping one
prostitute in jail for two weeks in New York was $3,000, while minimal amount spent to help those
wanting to change jobs); Jennings, supra note 5, at 1256, 1258 (myriad costs involved in arresting,
processing and prosecuting prostitutes). Most police actions and crackdowns are motivated by political
and community pressure. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 109; D. PACE & J. STYLES, supra note 40, at
132; G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 11-12.
46. C. WINICK & P. KINSIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE 109 (1973); PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE,
supra note 5, at 8 (arrests result in dependence on pimps and, by causing many prostitutes to move to
other cites, increase their sense of isolation); Haft, supra note 42, at 15 (constant arrests and fines
lock women into prostitution both by forcing them to rely on pimps for bail and by creating criminal
records that make it difficult to find other work); Jennings, supra note 5, at 1246-47 (pimps "provide
bail and obtain legal services in the event a prostitute is arrested").
47. 20/20, supra note 19, at 6 (according to Cleveland police intelligence report, woman "is
placed in a white slavery or indentured servant ring, in which she works off the money fronted by the
organization"); see also D. PACE & C. STYLES, supra note 40, at 137 (although some women initially
intended their involvement in prostitution to be temporary, "once in the business and under the aus-
tere direction of a pimp, it is difficult for them to return to the work-a-day world"); R. ROSEN, supra
note 1, at 172 ("[flear of violence frequently makes escape impossible or unimaginable for many
contemporary prostitutes"). "These girls in massage parlors are mostly young girls. There is an ele-
ment of fear involved, and they're in a foreign country. So once they get here, they're more or less
stuck." Russo Interview, supra note 20.
48. Civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is part of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982
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terstate or foreign commerce through a "pattern of racketeering activity"
occurring within a ten year period.50 Racketeering activity is defined as
the violation of state and federal offenses listed in the RICO statute, in-
cluding the offense of trafficking in women. 5' The driving force behind
the provision is to harness private interests to accomplish what the state
does not have the resources to do. Civil RICO, in essence, empowers pri-
vate prosecutors.
This section shows how the nature and organization of prostitution
rings fit the statutory requirements needed to invoke civil RICO. It argues
that because injury to "business or property" 2 should encompass the sort
of injury incurred by prostitutes, the injury requirement needed for civil
RICO standing5" should be satisfied, thereby giving prostitutes a private
right of action against the prostitution enterprise.
& Supp. III 1985). RICO was enacted in response to the increasing strength and growth of organized
crime. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 188 (1967) ("organized crime has been expanding despite the
Nation's best efforts to prevent it"). As traditional criminal statutes had failed to curb organized
criminal activities, RICO was passed "to enable the Federal Government to address a large and
seemingly neglected problem." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981). To accomplish
this, Congress authorized private civil actions against RICO violators. See 1976 TASK FORCE, supra
note 29, at 103 (civil sanctions seen as useful approaches to fighting organized crime).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Some private individuals forced into prostitution have shown
interest in suing their procurers, as in the case of two women promised show-business jobs in Japan
and then pressured into prostitution. The women said they tried to get help from the U.S. Embassy
but that "'the officers of the Foreign Service refused to render any . . . aid or assistance.'" The suit
named the Japanese agents and their aides as well as then Secretary of State Alexander Haig as
defendants. Shearer, Vice Ring, Wash. Post, June 13, 1982 (Parade Magazine), at 15, col. 1.
50. 18 U.S.C. §1962(a)-(d) (1982); 18 U.S.C § 1961(5) (1982).
51. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982)). The term "white slavery" was first used to distinguish the problem
from 19th-century black slavery, but racial and class prejudice soon lead to the portrayal of a "white
slave" to include only innocent white women. K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 27; R. ROSEN, supra note
1, at 62. See generally supra note 1. This Note rejects the term and uses "traffic in women," ".sex
slave trade," or "Mann Act" instead.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
53. This Note argues that women injured by prostitution enterprises can sue under the injury to
"business or property" provision of section 1964(c). See infra text accompanying notes 79-106. Al-
though suing criminal enterprises can be daunting, private plaintiffs can receive legal assistance and
other resources from groups ranging from prostitutes' rights organizations, such as COYOTE (Call
Off Your Old Tired Ethics), to advocacy groups such as NOW (National Organization for Women).
The gamut of organized crime is wide, ranging from organized criminal activities conducted by
groups of individuals to mob-type organized crime such as the Mafia. Private individuals who sue the
latter are likely to encounter significant hurdles. Aside from obvious fear of retaliation and the ex-
treme disparity in power and wealth between plaintiff and defendant, such suits are also difficult to
execute. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 260 n.59 (1982) (Professor Blakey was Chief Counsel of Senate Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures in 1969-1970, when Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 910452, 84 Stat. 941, was considered.). The difficulty lies in determining and locating
the defendant's assets, getting to the assets if they are held under a third party's name or controlled by
corporate shells, and preventing the assets from being dissipated prior to seizure. See Blakey, supra,
for a discussion of government reports and findings examining this problem. However, the Mafia and
other underworld-type organizations are not the only groups targeted by RICO. In fact, RICO
neither equates nor identifies "organized crime" with the Mafia alone. See generally 1986 REPORT,
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A. Harsh Penalties
To encourage private civil action, the Act provides great monetary incen-
tives for successful plaintiffs by granting them recovery of treble damages,
court costs, and attorney's fees.5" Congress clearly realized not only the
need to deal with individuals involved in criminal enterprises, but also the
value of attacking "the economic base through which those individuals
constitute such a serious threat . . . ." Large monetary awards serve
both to provide incentives for private plaintiffs and to divest organized
crime of its financial base.
To ensure that private plaintiffs have expansive avenues to institute
RICO suits, Congress granted broad procedural rules regarding venue
and process. 56 It authorized the courts to serve summons on and join par-
ties residing in other districts, if justice so requires. Thus private plaintiffs
can cause any defendant, even one with international prostitution net-
works, to be sued if the defendant has the specified jurisdictional link to
the U.S.
B. Elements of Civil RICO
To have a private cause of action, a plaintiff must prove the existence of
certain RICO elements. She must show that she has been injured from the
operation of an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce and
conducted via acts constituting a "pattern of racketeering."
supra note 40, at 23. Senator McClellan, the sponsor of RICO, said that "in none of the hearings or
in the processing of legislation in which I have been involved has the term been used in this circum-
scribed fashion." Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Ba-
sic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013 n.15 (1980) (quoting GAM-
BLING IN AMERICA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD
GAMBLING 181-82 (1976)). Thus, under civil RICO, private plaintiffs can sue any organized crimi-
nal activities conducted through an enterprise and sufficiently related to constitute a pattern.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
55. S. R:P. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (Report of Sen. McClellan). Civil remedies
are "concerned with prevention and restitution, not with incarceration." Gardner, Increasing the Ef-
fectiveness of the Criminal Prosecutor Through Creative Use of the Civil Courts, 10 PROSECUTOR
293, 295 (1974). Thus these remedies are particularly effective in attacking the financial bases of
organized crime. "Organized crime is an economic phenomenon. It exists not for honor, not for mys-
tique of the secret society, not for anything else but profit. . . . [Tihe solution to organized crime in
the broadest terms is simply to eliminate the profit." NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATT'ys GEN., THE USE
OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 5 (rev. ed. 1977) (citation omitted). A similar
assessment appears in the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur's comments on the business of traffic in women:
"Many violations of human rights [are] committed under the pretense of political excuse, civil war,
subversion, national security, disloyalty to the state. . .; here is no political motive at all. The motive
is profit." Radio U.N., supra note 12, at 2.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a)-(d) (1982) ("Any civil action . . . may be instituted in the district court
of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts
his affairs.").
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1. Organization: The Enterprise
Statutorily defined, "enterprise" can be an "individual," a "legal en-
tity," or a "group of individuals associated in fact." 5 This definition is
interpreted to mean an "ongoing" and "continuing unit" of "persons asso-
ciated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of con-
duct."58 It must have a "financial purpose"59 and must be more than a
loose group created only to commit the racketeering activity. In other
words, the enterprise must be "a separate and discrete element of a RICO
violation."60
Where traffic rings are closely coordinated and organized, where they
are involved in an ongoing process of procurement for prostitution, and
where they have sound financial bases, they clearly satisfy the enterprise
element required by RICO."' In addition, because the term "enterprise"
may comprise both legitimate and illegitimate organizations, 62 prostitution
rings organized for solely illegitimate purposes-without infiltrating or
investing in legitimate businesses-would still qualify as RICO
enterprises.
2. Pattern of Racketeering
To prove a "pattern of racketeering activity," a plaintiff must show that
the defendant has, within the last ten years, committed two violations of a
number of acts listed in the RICO statute.6" Known as "predicate acts,"
these include a number of state and federal offenses, such as kidnapping,
mail and wire fraud, and interstate transportation of women for
prostitution.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
58. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). The enterprise is not simply the "pat-
tern of racketeering" but rather must be a unit whose existence goes beyond that needed to commit the
predicate acts. In other words, the " 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity,'" although
"the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce .... ." Id. In
direct opposition to the views of the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit
holds that the enterprise must also "have an existence that is independent, self-contained, separate and
distinct" from the pattern of racketeering. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1371-72 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); see also United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193,
1198-1201 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). For a critique of the Eighth Circuit's
holdings, see Blakey, supra note 53, at 299 n.165.
59. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 58-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (commission of predicate acts for
political or other non-economic purpose not within RICO).
60. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962
(1982).
61. See supra notes 6-7, 26-28, and accompanying text (organized structure of prositution rings).
Racketeering acts described in Section I are committed through an organized and structured enterprise
that exists apart from the racketeering activities at issue.
62. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81; see United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (5th
Cir. 1977) (enterprise does not have to be legitimate business infiltrated by organized crime; prostitu-
tion rings engaged at onset in illegitimate activities are also RICO enterprises).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (5) (1982).
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Kidnapping applies whenever a woman is abducted.6" Mail and wire
fraud pertain whenever the mails or wires are used in "any scheme or
artifice to defraud" through "false or fraudulent pretenses." 5 False pre-
tenses regarding a present or past fact as well as regarding a point in the
future are deemed mail or wire fraud if transmitted accordingly. 6 Thus,
for instance, a fraudulent promise of a legitimate entertainment job made
via mail or wire in order to lure a woman into prostitution would consti-
tute a violation of the mail or wire fraud statute. Under the Mann Act, a
violation occurs when a person "transports in interstate or foreign com-
merce . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution. 61 7 Prostitu-
tion rings that transport women into the U.S. from foreign countries as
well as those that transport women across states within the U.S. are vio-
lating the Mann Act.68
Because RICO is not aimed at sporadic, individual violators, the predi-
64. See White Slavery Ring Indictments in Wis., Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 18, 1972, at 20, col. I
(ring kidnapping women from bars and forcing them into prostitution); see also supra note 8.
RICO prohibits a wide array of criminal activities. Section 1961(1)(A) designates eight state law
felonies ("any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
or dealing in . . . dangerous drugs"), and §§ 1961(1)(B) and (C) include a list of federal criminal
statutes encompassing acts indictable under various sections of U.S.C. titles 18 and 29. The RICO
statute "does not make criminal conduct that before its enactment was not already prohibited ... 
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 53, at 1021 n.71.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Violation of this statute constitutes a predicate act under § 1961(1)
of RICO.
66. The Supreme Court emphasized as early as 1896 the breadth of the mail fraud statute. See
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) ("It was with the purpose of protecting the
public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used to
carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip it of value to confine it to such
cases as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is
only the allurement of a specious and glittering promise.").
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982); see 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982) ("Whoever. . . entices or coerces any
woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce . . . for the purpose
of prostitution . . . whether with or without her consent . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
.... " (emphasis added)); see also Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119 (1932) (Mann Act
covers "cases in which the woman consents to her own transportation"); United States v. Pelton, 578
F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978) (consent of woman to be transported is no
defense). Neither is it a defense that the woman transported is, has been, or plans to be engaged in
prostitution. Hattaway v. United States, 399 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); McGuire v.
United States, 152 F.2d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 1945). This Note takes the position that consent is mean-
ingless in this context not because women do not have the capacity to consent or make rational deci-
sions, but because "free choice" is easily distorted given the extreme disparity in bargaining power
between the parties. Cf Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
774-86 (1983); id. at 774-75 ("[Platernalistic restrictions in our law of contracts . . . [are] intended
to prevent an individual from contracting away too large a part of his personal liberty. The most
obvious and elementary restriction of this sort is the prohibition against contracts of peonage or self-
enslavement.").
68. In proving a predicate act, such as the Mann Act, a civil RICO plaintiff has an enormous
advantage over public prosecutors: She need prove those acts only by a preponderance of evidence.
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985); Blakey, supra note 53, at 259-60
n.59 (preponderance standard). Thus, for example, in cases where U.S. agents who book women for
entertainment in Japan plead ignorance of the situation there, supra note 32 and accompanying text,
the burden of proving their intention to procure is more easily satisfied under civil RICO by a private
plaintiff than under a criminal action by federal prosecutors.
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cate acts are required to be part of a "pattern of racketeering activity."
Courts have disagreed on the nexus needed among predicate acts to estab-
lish a pattern.69 However, all courts require that the predicate acts be
related to the enterprise's affairs.7 0 Thus, while the enterprise is an entity
separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity, there must be
a nexus between them in that the enterprise must be affected by, or con-
ducted via acts constituting a pattern of racketeering.71 Kidnapping, mail
or wire fraud, and the interstate transportation of women for prostitution
are conducted through organized prostitution enterprises and would
amount to a "pattern of racketeering activity" connected to the affairs of
the criminal enterprise.
C. Injury
A civil RICO plaintiff no longer needs to prove "competitive in-
jury 72 (an indirect injury suffered as a competitor) or "racketeering in-
69. Some courts have held that, to constitute a pattern, the predicate acts must be related to each
other by some common scheme, plan, or motive and cannot be simply a series of disconnected acts. For
a list of such cases, see Project, White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 173, 355 & n.1429. Other courts reject this requirement and instead hold that the predicate acts
need not be related to each other, as long as they are related to the enterprise's affairs. See id. at 355
& n.1434.
70. 18 U.S.C. §1962(b) makes it "unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity . . . to acquire or maintain. . . any interest in or control of any enterprise. . . ." (emphasis
added). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) prohibits conducting or participating in an "enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity." (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54
(2d Cir.), cert. denied., 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 & n.23 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied., 439 U.S. 953 (1978); see also Fitzpatrick, Elements of a RICO Action After
Sedima, in LITIGATION AND ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES, No. 139, CIVIL RICO 31-35 (1985) [hereinafter
CIVIL RICO] (discussion of requirement that enterprise must be affected by or conducted via pattern
of racketeering); O'Neill, The Elements of a Private Civil Action Under the RICO Statute After
Sedima, in CIVIL RICO, id. at 55-63 (analysis of requisite connection and degree of relationship
between enterprise and pattern of racketeering activities).
71. As long as the enterprise is an "ongoing organization" or a "continuing unit," United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981), some courts hold that even "different or unrelated crimes" can be
admitted as proof of "pattern" because they were perpetrated through and related to the affairs of the
enterprise. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136 (1982); see United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23.
72. Because civil RICO's treble damage provision was modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), many lower courts, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, 105 S.
Ct. 3275, had held that only those injured indirectly as competitors rather than those injured directly
by the commission of the predicate acts had RICO standing. For a list of decisions requiring a com-
petitive injury, see Sedima, 741 F.2d 482, 493 n.33 (2d Cir. 1984). The dissent in Sedima illustrates
the rejected competitive injury requirement: If a racketeer used arson and assault to force competitors
out of business and acquire their shares of the market, arson and assault constituted the predicate acts.
Those competitors forced out of business could recover under civil RICO. However, those who suf-
fered direct damages from the the predicate acts could not recover, for example, for the cost of the
building or for personal injury. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3303 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Contra
Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101,
1109-13 (1982) and Blakey, supra note 53, at 255-56 & nn.52-53, 261 n.63, 263 n.72 (legislative
history shows rejection of antitrust competitive injury for RICO purposes). Strict requirements for
antitrust plaintiffs for "standing to sue" are appropriate because to ruin an antitrust defendant by
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jury" 7 3 (an injury from the pattern of racketeering rather than simply
from the predicate acts). Under the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., "'racketeering activity' consists of no more and no
less than commission of a predicate act."'77 Thus the "compensable injury
. . . is the harm caused by the predicate acts sufficiently related to consti-
"175tute a pattern ....
This interpretation is extremely important for bringing victims of pros-
titution rings within the general ambit of civil RICO. Before Sedima re-
solved the controversy among the circuits regarding the necessity of prov-
ing "competitive" or "racketeering enterprise" injury,7 6 it was unclear
whether or not women injured by a Mann Act violation could even invoke
civil RICO. The injury suffered by them would have been unlikely to fit
the "racketeering" or "competitive" injury envisioned by certain circuits.
With the Court's decision in Sedima, however, injury resulting directly
from the predicate acts is sufficient to invoke RICO,77 provided all other
RICO elements are met. Since a violation of the Mann Act is a predicate
act, 7  a showing of injury stemming from such violation would qualify as
the sort of injury now recognized by RICO.
One significant barrier remains. Although Sedima now allows recovery
for injury from the predicate acts themselves, in the case of the Mann Act,
the section 1964(c) requirement of injury to "business or property" is one
of the elements that must be met before a victim can have a private right
of action against the prostitution ring. This Note argues that, given the
underlying purposes of RICO, the traditional concept of "property" in-
jury should be expanded to allow for such an action.
opening the door to frivolous suits would be antithetical to the purpose of the statute and would
further reduce competition. RICO, by contrast, should not be similarly restricted because its purpose
is to eradicate organized criminal activities.
73. Prior to Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, the "racketeering injury" requirement was adhered to by
many courts. See Comment, Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering Enterprise Injury Re-
quirement, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 364, 368 n.28 (1985) (list of courts requiring and list rejecting "rack-
eteering" injury). Even those courts requiring such an injury failed precisely to define it. Id. at
372-74. In practice, this requirement meant that a plaintiff victimized by acts of arson was unable to
recover immediately; instead the plaintiff had to wait until his or her property was damaged again in
another fire, show that because of his or her past record, he or she was denied fire insurance and
would not get reimbursed for damages from the new fire. This monetary loss would then qualify as
injury due to the "pattern" and would therefore be recoverable. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741
F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1984).
74. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285.
75. Id. at 3286.
76. This requirement would have precluded recovery for violation of certain predicate acts listed
in section 1961(1). See Blakey, supra note 53, at 257 & n.57 (civil RICO action would be precluded
where union fund is looted, because hardly possible to show competitive injury); id. at 258 & n.58 (no
civil RICO action where government agencies are corrupted by organized crime because government
hardly capable of being hurt competitively). Similarly, one would not speak of a woman injured by
prostitution enterprises as having suffered competitive injury.
77. 105 S. Ct. 3285-86.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
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D. Proposal To Expand the Scope of "Property Injury"
Injury to a victim's person or body should satisfy the standing require-
ment of injury to "property" as called for under section 1964(c).7 9 Within
this limited setting, the victim's body should be understood as property.
The first part of this section shows why this proposal does not contravene,
but indeed accords with, congressional purpose. The second part sets forth
the proposal itself. The last part contemplates questions of damages and
explores how they might be calculated.
1. Legislative History
The legislative history of RICO reveals nothing that would forbid this
interpretation. Congress was primarily concerned with the growth of or-
ganized crime.80 The Act's Statement of Findings and Purpose clearly
states that RICO is intended to "seek the eradication of organized crime
• . . by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.""1 Statements by members of Congress reflect
similar concern over the general threat posed by organized prime,"2 as
well as its infiltration into legitimate businesses.8 3 Because prostitution
rings and their traffic networks are operated and controlled by organized
criminal elements," often hiding behind a facade of legitimate enter-
prise, 5 they lie precisely within the core of congressional concern. Al-
lowing private civil actions to supplement limited government resources86
79. A private plaintiff must be able to show injury to "property" or "business" before a private
cause of action is granted. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
80. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 5872 (1969) (review by Sen. McClellan on development of organ-
ized crime in U.S. and on failure of traditional laws to stop its growth); Measures Relating to Organ-
ized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S.
2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 107-55 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings .on S. 30]; see also Blakey,
supra note 53, at 249-80 (extensive discussion of legislative history of RICO); Strafer, Massumi &
Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 681
n.195 (1982) (remarks of members of Congress regarding dangers of organized crime and need to
eradicate organized criminal activities).
81. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970)
(emphasis added).
82. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 80, at 700-01 & rin.307-13.
83. Id. at 687 nn.228-30.
84. See supra Section I.B. and accompanying notes.
85. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
86. "[E]xisting law, state and federal, . . . was not adequate to address the problem, which was
of national dimensions." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981). Because "temporary,
one-shot attacks" are not effective, "continuing pressure" must be exerted against organized crime.
AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 316, 325 (statement of Thomas Maxwell, former Assistant State
Attorney, Baltimore City). Furthermore, law enforcement agencies may not be as organized and well-
coordinated as organized crime, id. at 136 (statement of William J. Scott, former Special Assistant
U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois); these agencies also are faced with personnel shortages,
id. at 72-73 (testimony of Frank Rizzo, Philadelphia Police Department Inspector).
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would thus further the Congressional purpose of attacking criminal activi-
ties "on all available fronts.""7
Furthermore, Congress was concerned not just with organized crime
and its infiltration into businesses, but also with the underlying racketeer-
ing acts. 8 Because the Mann Act is listed as a racketeering act, activities
associated with it-prostitution rings engaged in the traffic of women, for
example-are precisely the sort of activities Congress sought to eradicate.
Private causes of action would further this goal.
To effectuate RICO's purpose in fighting organized crime and related
racketeering activities, Congress specifically wrote in a directive not found
in any other federal law that imposes criminal penalties: 9 "[Tihe provi-
sions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses."'90 In addition, the sponsors of RICO envisioned its creative use:
"The bill is innovative . . . . Hopefully, experts on organized crime will
be able to conceive of additional applications of the law. The potential is
great."9" RICO is not "limit[ed] [to] the remedies . . . already. . . estab-
lished. The ability of our chancery courts to formulate a remedy to fit the
wrong is one of the great benefits of our system of justice."19 2 It is precisely
within this context that this Note's proposals should be examined.
87. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (report of Sen. McClellan).
88. "While RICO had as one of its purposes preventing the takeover of legitimate business by
organized crime, it is myopic to read RICO as if that were its only purpose. RICO was also aimed at
racketeering." Blakey, supra note 53, at 254 n.49. In holding that RICO should be applied to wholly
illegitimate activities and enterprises as well as to legitimate businesses infiltrated by organized crime,
the Court stated that such application would "deal with the problem at its very source." United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591. The Court further said that "the infiltration of legitimate businesses was
of great concern, but the means provided to prevent that infiltration plainly included striking at the
source of the problem." Id. at 592-93 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court suggested that
RICO is applicable against illegal activities themselves and is not limited only to the infiltration of
legitimate business. Id. at 590. It follows then that RICO "is not limited to investment in or takeover
of legitimate businesses, but extends to the operation of 'enterprises,' . . . by 'racketeering acts
.' Blakey, supra, at 258 n.59. Both eradicating racketeering or predicate acts and preventing
the operation of an enterprise by racketeering are goals envisioned by Congress in enacting RICO.
Because the Mann Act is expressly listed as a racketeering act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), breaking up
prostitution enterprises used to traffic women would legitimately fall under RICO. See, e.g., United
States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 958 (5th Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16 (1983) ("Narcotics trafficking, loan sharking, insurance fraud, extortion, gambling, and pros-
titution-all crimes in which the proceeds primarily consist of money-were all objects of congres-
sional concern." (footnotes omitted)); United States v. Thompson, 669 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (6th Cir.
1982) (court refusing to allow RICO to be used "against every instance of venality," and citing with
approval use of RICO against prostitution ring protected by bribed prosecutor); cf. United States v.
Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 61 (2d. Cir. 1983) (court refusing to consider activities of terrorist groups as racke-
teering acts, stating that they are "worlds removed from that of such venal organizations as gambling,
narcotics, or prostitution rings").
89. Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 168 n.6 (1980).
90. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
91. 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska). Senator Hruska was a principal
sponsor of RICO and was involved from its inception to its final acceptance into law. See, e.g., 113
CONG. REc. 17,997-18,002 (1967). For a discussion of Senator Hruska's role in the legislative pro-
cess, see Blakey, supra note 53, at 253-56, 258-65.
92. 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (statement of Sen. McClellan). Representative Poff, another sponsor of
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2. Body as Property
Prostitution enterprises control and use prostitutes' bodies as vehicles for
conducting their illegal business. The victims' bodies are, in essence,
treated as property to generate profit for the enterprise. 3 If the injury is
perpetrated on the premise that the victims' bodies are "property," the
law should recognize this fact and address the violation rather than pre-
tend that it does not exist. For this purpose, courts should not be reticent
to acknowledge body as a form of property 4 and should allow women to
show injury in their "property" in order to invoke section 1964(c) of
RICO against prostitution rings. Prostitution enterprises, which have con-
sidered the prostitutes' bodies to be their property all along, should not be
allowed to switch horses midstream just because the equation no longer
serves their purpose. Moreover, the idea of conceptualizing one's body as
a form of property is in no way far-fetched. Courts, politicians, and phi-
losophers have at one time or another drawn this parallel.95 Courts should
RICO, also noted that the bill would "not only sharpen old tools but forge new tools of law enforce-
ment" as well. 113 CONG. REc. 17,947 (1967). Statements of sponsors are normally given great
weight by courts. S&E Contractors v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972) ("In construing laws
we have been extremely wary of . . . debates on the floor of Congress save for precise analyses of
statutory phrases by the sponsors of the proposed laws.") (citations omitted). Though RICO has been
applied more in cases involving business and commercial frauds, Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105
S. Ct. 3275, at 3287 n.16 (1985), its application should not be cabined by the reasoning used in those
very different settings. In fact, a Senate Committee Report commenting on section 1964, S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1970), noted that "[a]lthough certain remedies are set out, the list is
not exhaustive, and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the
corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent persons." Blakey, supra note
53, at 266 n.87; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 53, at 1042 (antitrust law is concerned with
competition, while RICO is "more concerned with compensating victims and making them whole"). A
creative interpretation designed to grant private rights of action to victims of prostitution enterprises is
thus within the ambit of RICO.
93. Where the pimp buys and sells the prostitute and uses her body to make a profit, he is clearly
considering her to be his property. See 1986 REPORT, supra note 40, at 59-60 ("[I]n some gangs,
women are used to generate income through prostitution . . . . Some gangs regard women . . . as
'club property,' . . . [or] the 'property' of individual members."), 66 ("[The gang's] general treatment
of. . . women, who are typically regarded as gang property, borders on slavery."); see also supra
notes 5, 8, 29, 35 and accompanying text.
94. This Note suggests that there are compensable interests in many things, even one's bodies,
which we prefer to consider inalienable and incommensurable. We set "price on things we desperately
would like to treat as priceless." G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 144 (1978). For
example, we assert "that anyone for whom an implant will be successful will be allotted one," id. at
154, in order to appear as though we are not "pricing lives." Id. Similarly, we are reluctant to price
or to assign property values to our bodies which we rightly consider sacred and priceless. Yet, while
we do not want to broadly see body as alienable property, we should not insist on consistency for
consistency's sake and refuse, in cases such as these, to imply a property notion to bodies in order to
provide relief precisely to those whose bodies have been treated as property.
95. Dicta in slavery cases drew parallels between "property" and "person" or "body." The court
in Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836), addressing the question of whether a
slave owner can bring a slave into a free state and then later force the slave to leave the state, stated,
"being contrary to the fundamental laws of this State, such general right of property cannot be exer-
cised or recognized here." Id. at 217. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), held
that the Fifth Amendment guarantee, that no one shall be denied life, liberty, and property, meant
that slave owners could not be deprived of their property. Similar analogies were drawn by both
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conceptually acknowledge body as property, not to legitimize the analogy
but to curb its abuse. This analogy, in fact, has come to be similarly rec-
ognized in family law cases as a derogatory one." Legal recognition of
this analogy for RICO purposes can provide leverage against those en-
gaged in such derogatory acts. Injury to a woman's body under the Mann
Act should therefore be given legal definition as injury to property,
thereby affording the woman standing to invoke civil RICO.
3. Damages
The issues surrounding civil RICO damages have largely been ignored,
especially by courts.9 7 As in the area of antitrust law, measuring damage
in the RICO context is similarly susceptible to problems of uncertainty.98
This section aims only to set a few parameters from which to analyze the
sort of recovery available for prostitution victims.
In measuring injury to a woman's body as property, damages such as
lost wages or lost opportunities due to her involvement in prostitution en-
terprises should be considered. The claim would be that but for this in-
volvement, her property (body) could have been put to better use. This
determination would naturally entail a case by case analysis with the out-
come depending on the specific fact situation of each case. For example,
an entertainer injured by prostitution fronts, posing as theatrical agencies
recruiting her for legitimate nightclub acts in Japan, should be able to
recover under this loss of opportunities theory. Legitimate show business
abolitionists and anti-abolitionists in the 1800's. Anti-abolitionists argued that Congress could not
abolish slavery because the Union had been formed to protect life, liberty, and property-and slaves
were property. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 42 (1965). Abolitionists used the same equation
to come up with a different conclusion: "Congress should immediately restore to every slave, the
ownership of his own body, mind and soul . . . The right of property, on the part of the master
over the slave, should instantly cease." Id. at 46 (statement of abolitionist Henry B. Stanton). "[I]f
justice adjudges the slave to be 'private property,' it adjudges him to be his own property, since the
right to one's self is the first right. . . ." Id. at 276 (abolitionist Theodore Dwight Weld). Both sides
assumed that a body was property. Their only difference lay in the question of who owned that
property. See also J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION para. 27 (J. Gough ed. 1946) (everyone "has a property in his person; this
nobody has any right to but himself"). This Note, of course, asserts that the prostitute's body is her
own property.
96. See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (1974) ("Neither
parent's interests with regard to his or her children are a property right . . . ."); Doe v. Doe, 163
Conn. 340, 307 A.2d 166, 168 (1972); In re Ladewig, 34 Ill. App. 3d. 393, 398, 340 N.E.2d 150, 154
(1975).
97. Parnon, RICO Damages: Look to the Clayton Act, Not the Predicate Act, 21 CAL. W.L. REV.
348, 348 & nn.2-5 (1985).
98. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 53, at 260 n.59 ("as in the antitrust area, while proof of cause
and the fact of damage ought to have to be made out, how a plaintiff meets its burden of proof as to
the amount of damage ought to be ameliorated considerably") (referring to cases where Supreme
Court has recognized that damage issues rarely can be measured with concrete exactness).
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jobs that she could have pursued and which could have been available to
her were lost.99
Another way of measuring damages would involve "looking to the un-
derlying predicate acts and utilizing the most analogous civil measure of
damages."' 00 The appropriate measure of damages would vary depending
on the type of injury suffered, which would in turn depend on the predi-
cate acts at issue. 10 The type of injury suffered would determine the type
of remedies available, in some cases tort-like remedies, in others, contrac-
tual type recovery.102 Following this mode of analysis, the type of injury
incurred from a Mann Act violation is likely to be some form of personal
injury. Although this Note does not propose that recovery for personal
injuries per se should be made available under civil RICO,0 3 it does ar-
gue that an exception should be made in the limited context of forced
prostitution.
For several compelling reasons, personal injuries should be recognized
in prostitution cases. Victims in many of these cases would be unable to
recover for lost wages or opportunities, and it would be incongruous to
deny them recovery altogether, when recovery would be granted to other
Mann Act victims.104 Furthermore, Congress broadly defined the class of
RICO plaintiffs to include victims of crimes ranging from fraud to sex
slave traffic.10 5 Since Sedima has held that direct victims of the predicate
acts can recover, it would be inconsistent that some victims in that class
99. Similarly, commentators have suggested that loss of wages resulting from unjust jail time
would count as "business or property" injury. See, e.g., Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 80,
at 664. However, this measurement may not be applicable to other factual scenarios, for example, to
cases involving Third World women brought to work in U.S. massage parlors, since the economic
opportunities available to them in their native countries may be less than what they have in the U.S.
A calculation of damages focused on lost wages may not be possible.
100. Parnon, supra note 97, at 348 (citing Gorelick, The Measure of Damages of RICO Actions,
in RICO: THE SECOND STAGE (ABA ed. Oct. 1984)).
101. Id. at 348-49.
102. Id. Parnon advocates a diametrically opposed approach, although his article is based on the
pre-Sedima definition of injury. Parnon, supra note 97. Parnon would examine damage measure-
ments by "a narrower standard based on Section Four of the Clayton Act. This standard would
exclude damages based on contractual 'expectation interests,' damages for personal injuries, and dam-
ages based on restitution or disgorgement, as well as other types of damages." Id. at 349. Further-
more, proof of "racketeering enterprise injury" required at the pleading stage by many courts before
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 1075, would be extended to the damages stage as well. The plaintiff would have to
show damages caused by a clear "racketeering injury" and would not recover for damages caused by
the predicate acts. Id. at 349 & n.14, 350. By contrast, responding to the Supreme Court's decision in
Sedima, which struck down the racketeering injury requirement, 105 S. Ct., at 3285-86, this Note
proposes that 1) a plaintiff need only show injury sustained by the commission of the predicate acts, 2)
the plaintiff be allowed to recover for this injury, and 3) damage measurements be based on the
underlying predicate acts whose commission first caused the injury.
103. Courts have traditionally held that civil RICO does not grant recovery for personal injuries.
See Kaufman, RICO Remedies, in CIVIL RICO, supra note 70, at 154-55 (discussion of cases deny-
ing recovery for personal injury).
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l) (1982).
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would be denied recovery because their injury does not neatly fit into the
traditional concept of "property" injury. 08 When a person is forced to
prostitute herself, clearly the injury involves something beyond business/
property/commercial injury. Courts facing civil RICO claims should rec-
ognize that, unlike other predicate acts, those covered by the Mann Act
threaten personal injury. Measuring damages for Mann Act violations
should take this fact into consideration.
III. REMAINING BARRIERS: POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENTS
A. Pending Bills
Sedima, over a strong dissent, held that a plaintiff need prove no injury
beyond that caused directly by the predicate acts. The Court, in its deci-
sion, invited Congress to explicate any limits on the scope of civil
RICO.107 Congress is currently doing just that, although primarily out of
concern that RICO is being used in ordinary business disputes to harass
106. The courts should fashion an effective remedy for each of the RICO predicate acts desig-
nated by Congress. The Mann Act is listed in section 1961(l) along with a wide range of other
predicate acts. The fact that other predicate acts normally involve injury to traditional business, prop-
erty, or commercial type injuries, thus resulting in easier standing and damage calculations, does not
mean that real and substantial injuries incurred from certain other predicate acts, the Mann Act, for
example, can simply be wished away by denying recovery to Mann Act victims altogether. RICO
should protect the rights of all victims of all predicate acts equally. In situations where a measurement
of lost wages is not possible, see supra note 99, recoveries for personal injuries should be granted. The
dissent in Sedima seems to have recognized this very concern:
[Miany of the predicate acts listed in § 1961 threaten or inflict personal injuries . . . . If
Congress in fact intended the victims of the predicate acts to recover for their injuries, as the
Court holds it did, it is inexplicable why Congress would have limited recovery to business or
property injury. It simply makes no sense to allow recovery by some, but not other victims of
predicate acts ....
105 S. Ct. at 3297 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
This Note argues that precisely because such discrepancy would not make "sense," damages from
personal injury caused by commission of predicate acts that inherently threaten personal injury should
be recoverable. This measurement of damages is consistent with the proposal set forth in this Note.
See supra Section II.D. Once courts accept the suggestion that body is "property" for civil RICO
purposes, then damages to "property" in essence include bodily damages. Besides bodily injury and
lost earnings, recovery can also be based on restitution theory, whereby proceeds from the prostitution
enterprise are placed in trust funds for educational and training programs for prostitutes, or for
projects to benefit shelters and covenant houses. The racketeering enterprise should not be allowed to
keep its wrongful profit simply because there may be cases in which damages to the prostitute cannot
be calculated.
A proposal to allow a limited class of plaintiffs personally injured by the perpetration of certain
predicate acts to sue has been suggested by Representative Clinger. H.R. 1704, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985). This bill to amend RICO would "authorize civil suits on behalf of victims of child pornogra-
phy and prostitution." The amendment would add 18 U.S.C. § 2251 or 2252, dealing with sexual
exploitation of children, to the list of predicate acts currently included in RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
It would also amend § 1964(c) to explicitly allow anyone injured "personally" by a violation of §
2251 or 2252 to sue. This Note also seeks to give a private right of action for plaintiffs injured by
prostitution enterprises. It argues, however, that civil RICO, as it currently stands, should already
allow for such suits.
107. 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
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legitimate businesses, who are thus forced to settle for fear of being la-
belled "racketeers." 108
Three bills to limit civil RICO are before Congress. One bill would
limit private civil action to those suffering "competitive, investment or
other business injury."109 It would also limit the use of the more "trouble-
some" predicate acts by requiring that at least one of the predicate acts be
something other than mail, wire, or securities fraud.110 Another bill would
amend the same private plaintiff provision to require that a defendant be
criminally convicted of a predicate act before the plaintiff can sue. 11 This
bill has garnered the most support in Congress so far." 2 The third bill
would entail three major changes.11 It would delete "racketeering" from
the title and all of the provisions of the statute; it would also require a
prior indictment, as well as limit the use of predicate acts relating to the
transportation of stolen goods, mail and wire fraud.
B. Proposal for Balance: Change Without Vitiation
As they stand, passage of any one proposed bill would unduly attenuate
RICO's strength in combatting criminal activities, especially those con-
nected with prostitution enterprises. Any requirement of prior conviction
or prior indictment would be problematic because it would defeat
"[p]rivate attorney general provisions . . . designed to fill prosecutorial
gaps."1 4 The private right of action option was instituted because Con-
gress saw that enforcement agencies were weakened by "official timidity
and inaction, or bribery and corruption."' 5 Requiring prior government
action would force plaintiffs to rely once again on government officials.116
Limiting the class of civil plaintiffs to those able to show competitive
injury would also unduly restrict RICO's scope. Harm directly caused by
perpetration of proscribed acts would not be recoverable, whereas harm
that is indirectly incurred would be.117 Direct injury would not be com-
108. Time To Reform RICO, The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 12, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
109. S. 1521, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
110. Id.
111. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
112. Bradley, Long Arm of the Rackets Law Draws Fire from White Collar Targets, The Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Feb. 7, 1986, at 21, col. 1.
113. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
114. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
115. Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1970) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) [hereinafter House
Hearings].
116. "[T]he compelled wait for the completion of criminal proceedings would result in pursuit of
stale claims, complex statute of limitations problems, or the wasteful splitting of actions ... "
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282 n.8.
117. See supra note 72; see also the American Bar Association report, reprinted in 115 CONG.
REc 6994-95 (1969) which opposed grafting strict antitrust requirements onto RICO:
[T]he use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for combating organized crime could create
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pensable, while indirect injury to one's competitive position would be.
This requirement could be tantamount to denying standing to victims of
prostitution enterprises altogether." 8 Given that the Mann Act is a predi-
cate act, it would be strange indeed if injury for this predicate act were
not recoverable, but injury to other predicate acts-those which by their
nature result in competitive injuries-would be. Similarly, limiting the
class of defendants to those with "organized crime" connections only in
order to exclude legitimate business would pose similar problems, making
the act unenforceable if not unconstitutional. 1 9
While congressional concern over the harassment of legitimate busi-
nesses may be reasonable, it should not override civil RICO's primary
purpose of fighting organized criminal activities and of providing a private
right of action for victims. 2° Congress passed the civil provisions because
it believed them to have "greater potential than that of the penal sanc-
tions,"121 and to be "more promising."22 One senator even saw the crimi-
nal sanctions as "an adjunct to the civil provisions. '" 3
To balance these two concerns of empowering victims of criminal activ-
ities and protecting legitimate businesses from harassment, this Note pro-
poses the following changes. Removing pejorative connotations by deleting
the label "racketeer" would be a good start in accommodating business
concerns. The fraud provisions could also be limited to curb overuse by
making fraud alone no longer sufficient; one of the two predicate acts
would need to be something other than mail, wire, or securities fraud.
This should be done without resort to a prior conviction or prior indict-
ment requirement; although good for protecting businesses, this would be
bad for fighting organized criminal activities. Some balance is needed, and
to this end, Congress should not go beyond limiting the scope of those
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons injured by organized crime who
might seek treble damage recovery. Such a private litigant would have to contend with a body
of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust context-setting strict requirements on ques-
tions such as "standing to sue" and "proximate cause."
Id. The ABA then recommended that "antitrust-type enforcement. . .[be] in a separate statute...
[to avoid] a commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating competition
.. " Id. RICO was adopted as an independent statute and not as part of the Sherman Act.
118. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
119. See Blakey, supra note 53, at 276 & n.119; Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 80, at
671-72.
120. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 53, at 1042; see also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3280 ("those who
have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given access to a legal remedy") (citing
House Hearings, supra note 115, at 520) (statement of Rep. Steiger).
121. Hearings on S. 30, supra note 80, at 408 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst).
122. See House Hearings, supra note 115, at 327 (statement of Association of N.Y.C. Bar).
123. 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("civil provisions [considered] the
more important feature of the bill").
1320
Vol. 96: 1297, 1987
Forced Prostitution and Civil RICO
provisions that most egregiously open up the floodgates for private RICO
suits against legitimate businesses.124
Another approach that may accommodate business concerns without
overly burdening the fight against organized crime is one implicitly sug-
gested by the Court in Sedima. Justice White, in a footnote, 12 5 suggests
that a "pattern" as defined in section 1961(5) requiring two racketeering
acts within ten years should be more stringently construed. A finding of
"pattern" should reflect evidence of a common continuous scheme in the
way the two acts relate, each undertaken in more than a single isolated
criminal episode. 26
Courts before Sedima did not strictly interpret the "pattern" require-
ment,127 and instead scrutinized the now obsolete requirement of "compet-
itive" and/or "racketeering" injury. Proposals for a more narrow inter-
pretation of the "pattern" requirement have been put forth since the
Sedima decision.1 28 Post-Sedima courts have also begun to place more em-
phasis on the "pattern" element.129 While this proposal can be said to be
simply a concoction of the Court with no clear basis in RICO's legislative
history 30 and potentially subject to its own set of difficulties,' it would
not result in the same evisceration of civil RICO the way existing bills
currently before Congress would.
This restricted definition of "pattern," coupled with the proposed
changes set forth in this Note, would leave intact the "private
prosecutorial" powers envisioned in civil RICO and endorsed in Sedima.
It would also leave intact Sedima's mandate to allow recovery to private
plaintiffs injured by the commission of the predicate acts. At the same
124. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 112, at 21 (businesses such as financial institutions, accounting
firms, banks, securities firms, and other organizations such as AFL-CIO pushing for amendment of
RICO; "less-monied groups" like Congress Watch, U.S. Public Interest Research Group opposing
pending amendments).
125. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
126. Id.
127. Chepiga, Bookin & Khuzami, The "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Requirement After
Sedima, in CIVIL RICO, supra note 70, at 76-77 (authors found only one case whereby RICO claim
was dismissed because predicate acts deemed not to constitute "pattern" of racketeering).
128. Proposal for amending the current definition of the pattern requirement by the National
District Attorneys Association and the National Association of Attorneys General set forth the follow-
ing: The two or more racketeering acts must be related to the enterprise, the acts must be related to
each other, but at the same time not so closely connected as to constitute only a single transaction. Id.
at 89-90. The Department of Justice also supports a stricter pattern requirement and suggests that
the proposed amendment should not allow civil suits "based on a single criminal episode or transac-
tion with only one victim." Id. at 90. For a discussion of the American Bar Association recommenda-
tions, see id. at 93-94 (proposal focuses on relatedness and continuity requirements needed to estab-
lish pattern).
129. Id. at 91-93 (discussion of lower courts' greater focus on the pattern requirement).
130. Id. at 96-98 (no requirement that predicate acts be related to each other in legislative his-
tory; only requirement that predicate acts be related to enterprise).
131. Id. at 98-101.
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time, the proposal would still be sensitive to the concerns of legitimate
business. It recognizes the need to close RICO's floodgate, only it proposes
that attempts to restrict RICO's scope be steered in a different direction,
and in a way which would preserve the utility of civil RICO in the fight
against organized criminal activities.
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